Security
An API that visits addresses supplied by its users is a classic target. Here is what the software does, and what it does not do.
The threat: SSRF
In an SSRF attack, someone asks the server to read an address they cannot reach themselves: an internal service, the admin interface of a router, or the metadata service of a cloud host.
What is covered
- Only
httpandhttpsare accepted, without credentials in the address, on a list of allowed ports (80 and 443 by default). localhost, internal names and any address that is not publicly routable are refused: private ranges, loopback, link-local including169.254.169.254, CGNAT, IPv6 ULA, IPv4-mapped addresses.- Unusual notations, such as
0x7f.1or2130706433, are normalised before the check. - A single private DNS record is enough to refuse a host name.
- Over HTTP, the validated DNS resolution is pinned to the connection, and every redirect is validated again.
- In the browser, two layers: every request the page makes is intercepted and validated, and the only network exit Chromium has is a proxy inside the API. On every connection, redirects included, that proxy applies the policy, resolves the name itself and connects to the address it has just validated.
- The API runs no code supplied by the caller. The only "programmable" inputs are CSS selectors, with bounds.
- Only
Accept-Language,User-AgentandReferercan be set towards the target.CookieandAuthorizationare excluded, because answers are cached per address. - What comes from a page stays data:
/htmlis served as plain text, thehtmlfield of/oembedis never interpreted, CSV output neutralises formulas.
What is not covered
- The content of the pages read is not filtered: treat every answer as untrusted data, and never inject it as is into HTML.
- The API does not check that you are allowed to read, copy or keep a page. That responsibility is yours.
- The validating proxy lives in the same process as the API: it does not replace egress filtering at network level (firewall, VPC), which remains recommended as defence in depth.
- A render runs the JavaScript of the page in Chromium. The protection is about reachable destinations, not about what the page does once loaded.
- Quota counters are not a protection against distributed denial of service.
- The repository README and
SECURITY.mdhave the details.
This site
- It loads no third-party script and sets no cookies.
- API answers are never interpreted as HTML here: they are displayed as text.
- The API key typed in the playground stays in memory in the tab; it is neither saved nor added to share links.
Reporting a vulnerability
Write to contact@kayzen-lyon.fr rather than opening a public issue. The /.well-known/security.txt file gives the same contact.