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Security

An API that visits addresses supplied by its users is a classic target. Here is what the software does, and what it does not do.

The threat: SSRF

In an SSRF attack, someone asks the server to read an address they cannot reach themselves: an internal service, the admin interface of a router, or the metadata service of a cloud host.

What is covered

  • Only http and https are accepted, without credentials in the address, on a list of allowed ports (80 and 443 by default).
  • localhost, internal names and any address that is not publicly routable are refused: private ranges, loopback, link-local including 169.254.169.254, CGNAT, IPv6 ULA, IPv4-mapped addresses.
  • Unusual notations, such as 0x7f.1 or 2130706433, are normalised before the check.
  • A single private DNS record is enough to refuse a host name.
  • Over HTTP, the validated DNS resolution is pinned to the connection, and every redirect is validated again.
  • In the browser, two layers: every request the page makes is intercepted and validated, and the only network exit Chromium has is a proxy inside the API. On every connection, redirects included, that proxy applies the policy, resolves the name itself and connects to the address it has just validated.
  • The API runs no code supplied by the caller. The only "programmable" inputs are CSS selectors, with bounds.
  • Only Accept-Language, User-Agent and Referer can be set towards the target. Cookie and Authorization are excluded, because answers are cached per address.
  • What comes from a page stays data: /html is served as plain text, the html field of /oembed is never interpreted, CSV output neutralises formulas.

What is not covered

  • The content of the pages read is not filtered: treat every answer as untrusted data, and never inject it as is into HTML.
  • The API does not check that you are allowed to read, copy or keep a page. That responsibility is yours.
  • The validating proxy lives in the same process as the API: it does not replace egress filtering at network level (firewall, VPC), which remains recommended as defence in depth.
  • A render runs the JavaScript of the page in Chromium. The protection is about reachable destinations, not about what the page does once loaded.
  • Quota counters are not a protection against distributed denial of service.
  • The repository README and SECURITY.md have the details.

This site

  • It loads no third-party script and sets no cookies.
  • API answers are never interpreted as HTML here: they are displayed as text.
  • The API key typed in the playground stays in memory in the tab; it is neither saved nor added to share links.

Reporting a vulnerability

Write to contact@kayzen-lyon.fr rather than opening a public issue. The /.well-known/security.txt file gives the same contact.

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